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In the midst of the War of American Independence (1775-1783) the British state embarked 
upon a project to overhaul the management of its ‘extraordinary patchwork – of old and new, 
useless and efficient, corrupt and honest’ public finances.1 In 1780 it established a Commission 
for the Examination of the Public Accounts with freedom to examine any and all relevant 
records and call all post-holders to give evidence under oath. The purpose of the Commission 
was to reduce costs, improve efficiency and eliminate corruption and sinecurism. Its access 
was ‘unprecedented in scope’ and its outcomes were ‘unprecedented in consequence’.2 Over 
the period from 1780 to 1787 it produced a total of fifteen comprehensive reports. Binney 
argues that it was this work that began the transition of the British state’s finances from ancient 
to modern, eliminating the ‘clumsy hand of the Middle Ages’ and creating a system of public 
finance that was fit for the modern period.3 Yet, despite the Commission’s wide-ranging 
powers, it did not have jurisdiction over a central part of the state’s financial system: the Bank 
of England.  
The Bank of England, at this time, was still a private company and, although essential 
to the management of public finance, it could not be made answerable to Parliament in quite 
the same way as the Exchequer. The Bank could, therefore, have ignored the reforming zeal of 
the moment. It did not. In March 1783 the Bank’s Court of Directors ordered the establishment 
of its own Committee of Inspection. The Committee was ‘appointed to inspect & enquire into 
the mode & execution of the Business as now carried on in the different departments of the 
Bank’.4 In other words, it had much the same purpose as the Commission already established. 
It aimed to ensure that the Bank was operating efficiently, that its clerks were above reproach 
and that the public could place their trust in its management of the national debt. As we shall 
see, the Committee followed closely the patterns of working established by the Commission. 
Put together, the two sets of reports can offer the historian a comprehensive account of the 
workings of Britain’s system of state finance at the end of the eighteenth century.  
                                                          
1 G. E. Aylmer ‘From Office-Holding to Civil Service: the genesis of modern bureaucracy’, Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 30 (1980), p. 106.   
2 J. E. D., Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 1774-92 (Oxford, 1958), p. 282.  
3 Ibid. See also H. G. Roseveare, Treasury: The Evolution of a British Institution (London, 1969), p. 110; P. 
Harling, The Waning of ‘Old Corruption’: the politics of economical reform in Britain, 1779-1846 (Oxford, 
1996), p. 10.  
4 Bank of England Archive [henceforth BEA], M5/212, Minutes of the Committee of Inspection, 1783, fo. 1.  
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These eighteenth-century inspections have not been noticed very often in the scholarly 
literature. Brewer gives no space to the Commission for Examining Public Accounts.5 Harling 
moves quickly on to the imperatives for reform created by the wars against Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic France.6 Aylmer mentions the Commission in passing but only as part of his 
investigations into developing bureaucracies.7 Even Roseveare pays more attention to the 
passage and consequences of reforming Acts of Parliament than the work of the Commission.8 
Indeed, only Binney and Torrance, among more recent work, give detailed attention to the 
Commission’s origins and work.9 The Bank of England’s Committee of Inspection has thus far 
received almost no recognition. Clapham made only brief mention of the Inspection in his 
history of the Bank and he dismissed its task and reforms as ‘matters of purely internal 
history’.10 Of the Bank’s historians the only one to have given consideration to the Committee 
of Inspection was W. Marston Acres in his work on the Bank’s staff. Acres, however, 
misinterpreted the purpose of the Inspection attributing its appointment to the increase in 
incidences of counterfeit notes being presented to the Bank and to a number of high profile 
frauds committed by Bank staff.11  
 This article will employ the reports created by the Bank’s Committee to explore the 
aims, methods and findings of those who inspected the Bank and the outcomes of their work. 
It will first explain the context in which the Commission for Examining Public Accounts and 
the Committee for Inspection emerged and the aims of each. It will then focus on the Bank 
Committee for Inspection’s modes of working and the ways in which the Inspectors presented 
their findings. The final section will consider the measures against which the Inspectors judged 
the Bank’s processes and its workers and the connections between their findings and their 
recommendations. These question relate to the themes of this special issue because they allow 
us to explore aspects of an agenda of scrutiny and improvement in the management of the 
British public finances. Although focusing chiefly on the question of how data about complex 
business was collected, understood and utilised, the article will also show how pressure for 
more transparent and less ‘corrupt’ governance was translated into a system of investigation 
                                                          
5 J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688-1783 (London, 1994).  
6 Harling, Old Corruption.   
7 Aylmer, ‘Office-Holding to Civil Service’.  
8 Roseveare, Treasury, pp. 118-138.  
9 Binney, British Public Administration; John Torrance, ‘Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation: the 
Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts, 1780-1787’, Past and Present, 78 (1978), pp. 56-81. 
10 J. H. Clapham, The Bank of England:  A History (2 volumes, London, 1945), I, p. 202; Giuseppi also 
attributes the appointment of the Committee to the need to address lax procedures: John Giuseppi, The Bank of 
England: a history from its foundation in 1694 (London, 1966), p. 69. 
11 W. M. Acres, The Bank of England from within (2 vols., London, 1931), I, p. 238. 
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and oversight that underpinned the investing public’s acknowledged trust in the Bank of 
England and its management of the British national debt.   
 
 
I 
 
 
The late eighteenth-century inspection and reform of the public finances was born in great part 
out of the strains of the War of American Independence. This conflict brought significantly 
increased expenditure and the administrative complexities of funding and fighting a war in the 
colonies. It created anxiety about the nature of the conflict and the mother country’s 
relationship with its American colonists. And it was accompanied by broader economic and 
political strains, including increased tensions in those other strongholds of nascent empire: 
Ireland, India and the West Indies. Indeed the Irish managed to extract significant concessions 
during the final years of the war.12  
Nonetheless, Harling, Roseveare and Torrance also acknowledge a more complex 
heritage for reform. Roseveare links the reforms of the 1780s directly to discontent with the 
Crown’s spending and influence over ‘pensions and places’ and he argues that the reformers’ 
case was actually weaker in the 1780s than it would have been in the 1760s.13 Harling eschews 
the idea of a consensus for reform as argued by earlier scholars.14 He suggests that the costs 
and mismanagement of the War of American Independence merely revived ‘county’ discontent 
with the prodigality of the British state and, in particular, led to the formation of the Association 
movement.15 The Association Movement was formed of ‘independent-minded land-owners 
and tenants and radical professionals, shopkeepers and artisans’.16 Phillips sees at its heart a 
simple demand for ‘order and economy in administration’.17 Moreover, Torrance argues that 
this group was actually dominated by ‘the progressive rentier’, men who were interested in the 
preservation of public credit and were likely to have had capital tied up in the funds. ‘Fiscal 
conservatism ’ was a banner under which all those groups could unite. One of Torrance’s most 
                                                          
12 P. J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India and America, c. 1750-1783 (Oxford, 
2005), p. 353 
13 Roseveare, Treasury, p. 119.  
14 In this he includes Binney. Harling, Old Corruption, p. 26.  
15 Harling, Old Corruption, pp. 31-33.  
16 Ibid. p. 33.  
17 N. C. Phillips, ‘Edmund Burke and the County Movement, 1779-1780’, English Historical Review,  
76, (1961), p. 256. 
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salient points is that the Commissioners for Public Accounts not only owed their existence to 
this new mood of ‘fiscal conservatism’ but also shared it. He identifies throughout their reports 
the guiding hand of ‘patriotic indignation and the rhetoric of frugality’.18 The public finances 
were, therefore, placed in the hands of careful men determined to root out corruption and 
inefficiency.  
 Yet the political controversy that accompanied these attempts at reform should not be 
underestimated. Reform was the product of some intense political pressures both from factions 
within and outside of Parliament.19 Nor was the Bank of England immune from those 
pressures.20  When Lord North, in 1781, argued that the Bank was ‘from long habit and the 
usage of many years, was a part of the constitution’ and ‘…had contributed very essentially to 
establish the national credit, a matter equally advantageous to this country both at home and 
abroad’ he was not praising but defending the institution.21 North did not convince everyone. 
The Bank’s close relationship to the state was deemed problematic, its monopoly was 
dangerous, its control of the system of public debt too expensive to maintain. Sir George Savile 
argued that the ‘public had an estate to sell’ and was selling it too damned cheap.22 Whig MP 
David Hartley, also challenged the Charter renewal of 1781, arguing it had a value and should, 
therefore, be offered to the highest bidder.23 This, therefore, was the atmosphere in which the 
Bank’s own Committee for Inspection was established.  
 The principles that guided the work of the Commission for Examining Public Accounts 
and which, arguably, established the precedent for the Bank’s Inspection, are summarised by 
Binney and fall broadly into four categories: a drive towards greater efficiency, a drive towards 
greater openness and transparency, the removal of corruption or the temptation to corruption 
and the assurance that each post was useful and occupied by the post-holder.24 The work of the 
Commission was also supplemented in following years by further Parliamentary Commissions 
to examine spending and methods of accounting and by William Pitt the younger’s attempts to 
reduce the national debt and improve various elements of the system.25 Nonetheless it must be 
admitted that the connection between the two investigations is not made explicit in the Bank’s 
                                                          
18 Torrance, ‘Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation’, p. 76.  
19 Harling, Old Corruption, p. 7.  
20 H. V. Bowen, ‘The Bank of England during the Long Eighteenth Century, 1694-1820’ in R. Roberts and D. 
Kynaston eds., The Bank of England: Money, Power and Influence 1694-1994 (Oxford, 1995), p. 9. 
21 Lord North, Speech of 13 June 1781 in the Committee of Ways and Means quoted in Bowen, ‘Bank of 
England’.  
22 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 181.  
23 David Hartley, Considerations on the proposed renewal of the Bank Charter (London, 1781), p. 19.  
24 Binney, British Public Finance, pp. 14-15.  
25 M. Daunton, State and Market in Victorian Britain: War, Welfare and Capitalism (Woodbridge, 2008), p. 47.  
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records. They merely record the decision to establish the Committee of Inspection without 
listing the reasons why it was established.  
Yet, several key factors point to a close connection. The first of those relates to the men 
involved. Key to our understanding of the establishment of the Committee for Inspection is the 
knowledge that two of the Bank’s directors, Richard Neave and Samuel Beachcroft, had been 
among the six Commissioners for the Examining of Public Accounts. Neave was a Bank of 
England director between 1763 and 1811, a long-serving member of the all-important 
Committee of the Treasury and Governor of the Bank between 1783 and 1785, hence at the 
time when the Committee of Inspection was appointed. He must, therefore, be judged to have 
had a significant role in the establishment of the Bank’s Inspection. Samuel Beachcroft was a 
director of the Bank between 1760 and 1796, governor from 1775 to 1777 and he too sat on 
the Committee of the Treasury. It seems likely, therefore, that these two men had a great deal 
of influence over the establishment of the Inspection.26   
 The working practices of the Committee also were a close match with those of the 
Commission for Examining Public Accounts. The Bank’s Inspectors, like the Commission, had 
been given permission to call any and all papers it required before it and to question any persons 
necessary. Both were empowered not just to inspect but also to recommend any such changes 
as would improve efficiency and eliminate corruption. Each body pursued a similar mode of 
inspection. They both visited one department after another and published interim findings and 
recommendations as their work continued.27 As noted above, similarities existed between the 
practical agendas of the two bodies also. Both were concerned chiefly with effectiveness of 
working systems, the nature of the work and the integrity of the post holder with regard to job 
performance and remuneration. In this respect, the Commissioners, of course, were faced with 
somewhat different problems from the Bank’s Inspectors. The Commissioners were dealing 
with a long-established system mired in tradition and dependent on sinecure posts. The Bank’s 
Inspectors were faced with a system that was, on the whole, fit for purpose but had grown out 
of all proportion in the years running up to the Inspection. The result of this was systems that 
relied upon short-cuts and had grown lax to accommodate much higher volumes of work. 
Equally, the Inspectors found no obvious sinecures. Each post at the Bank was associated with 
a specific set of duties and held by a working post-holder. Yet, as we shall see, they did find 
that not all of those post-holders were similarly diligent.  
                                                          
26 Torrance agrees with this assessment. Torrance, ‘Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation’, p. 60.   
27 Torrance, ‘Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation’, p. 66; Bank Archives, M5/212; M5/213, passim.  
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One significant difference between the Commission and the Bank’s Inspectors was that 
the latter were appointed from within. No external views were to be brought to bear on the 
situation at the Bank. As we have seen, the Commission were arguably sympathetic to the 
reform agenda at hand and Richard Neave’s undoubtedly strong role in the establishment of 
Committee of Inspection makes it likely that he selected men sympathetic to his cause to 
comprise the Committee. Nonetheless, we should bear in mind that the Inspectors were Bank 
men compiling a purely internal report.  
The Inspectors were three in number and they were appointed by order of the Court of 
Directors in March 1783. They were Samuel Bosanquet, Thomas Dea and Benjamin Winthrop. 
Bosanquet was a banker and Winthrop a merchant. Nothing is known of Dea’s occupation. All 
three were directors of the Bank but of relatively short standing. Perhaps this was a case of the 
new boys being trusted with the broom to sweep clean.28 Bosanquet had first been elected 12 
years previously in 1771.29 Dea had been elected in 1775 and Winthrop only in 1782.30 All 
three had served on the Bank’s Committee for House and Servants, a committee which, as its 
name suggests, was responsible for various aspects of the maintenance of the Bank’s premises 
and the pay, employment and disciplining of servants. The reports of the Committee, which 
met every three months, tend to suggest a rather formulaic agenda. There were warrants to 
approve and sign for the payment of tradesmen and suppliers, decisions to be made regarding 
any changes of the former but when it came to reports on the behaviour of the staff very few 
direct complaints were made and usually the various heads of department noted only 
absences.31 Nevertheless, Bosanquet, Dea and Winthrop’s service on this committee must 
suggest that they were broadly familiar with the day to day running of the Bank and of the 
house rules governing the working practices of the clerks and had encountered instances of 
how those rules could be circumvented. However, there is no record of any of the three having 
served on any other of the Bank’s committees prior to their appointment to the Committee of 
Inspection.  
The Inspectors commenced their work in March 1783 and spent a little over a year 
pursuing their business. They took a holiday in August and September of 1783 but no other 
significant breaks and they wrapped up their reports in April 1784. But theirs was not the final 
                                                          
28 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 203.  
29 Bosanquet continued to serve as a director until his death on 5 July 1806. He was elected deputy governor in 
1789 and 1790 and governor in 1791 and 1792. BEA, M5/436, Directors Annual Lists, fo. 25.  
30 Dea served as a director on and off until 1798. Winthrop served with occasional breaks until his death on 7 
October 1809. He was elected deputy governor from 1802-03 and governor from 1804-05. BEA, M5/436, 
Directors Annual Lists, fos. 26-27.  
31 BEA, M5/376, Minutes of the Committee of House and Servants, passim.  
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inspection at the Bank. From its beginnings in 1783, the Bank of England developed various 
committees to manage its business. By 1800 it had established three permanent Committees of 
Inspection with oversight of the Stock Offices, the Printing and Bank Notes Offices and the 
Cash Offices respectively. The procedures for recruitment and management of staff had also 
been tightened quite considerably by the start of the nineteenth century. The fact that a system 
of inspection was being developed is important. The growth of the bureaucratic career and the 
rise of managerial capitalism was, according to Chandler prompted by the emergence of the 
railroads, as the first enterprise that was sufficiently complex to require the new managerial 
methods of the division of specialised labour, close supervision and detailed managerial 
knowledge.32 Some scholars have identified the rise of bank inspections during the late 
nineteenth century as part of this process.33 According to McKinlay and Wilson, the individual 
was at this time being exposed to new forms of ‘administration, management and raised 
expectations of self-management’ and the tools of this system were the means to make the 
employee visible: the staff ledger, the recording of competencies and the inspection.34 It will 
become clear from what follows that all this was in place at the Bank of England by the end of 
the eighteenth century.  
 
 
II 
 
The Inspectors had the power, given by the Bank’s Court of Directors, to ‘call before them all 
or any of the Servants of the Bank for such information as they shall require…’35 Their mode 
of inspection seemed to be observe the clerks at work and then follow up with interviews and 
enquiries. There is some indication that they gave notice of their itinerary to the senior men.36 
They met regularly to review their minutes which were recorded by a secretary, Mr Aslett, 
who, when his work was finished, received the commendation of the Inspectors as having been 
‘very diligent in his Duty, & in his attendance on us’.37 From their reports, it seems that the 
Inspectors’ behaviour was not overtly intrusive or forceful. Indeed, there were significant 
                                                          
32 Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: the managerial revolution in American Business (Cambridge Mass. 
and London, 1977).  
33 A. McKinlay and R. G.Wilson, ‘“Small acts of cunning”: bureaucracy, inspection and the career, c. 1890-
1914’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 17 (2006), pp. 657-678.  
34 Ibid. p. 658.  
35 BEA, M5/212, fo. 1.  
36 See for example, BEA, M5/213, fo. 21. 
37 BEA, M5/213, fos. 177-78.  
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periods during which the Inspectors consulted with numerous staff about proposed changes, 
suggesting that they had respect for the accumulated knowledge of the staff and an 
understanding that they were engaging in the alteration of physical activities and processes of 
which they had less understanding. Yet, while periods of consultation point to a cooperative 
process, we should perhaps not underestimate the extent to which being observed could be 
intimidating. Reflections on the inspection process from the late-nineteenth century point to 
feelings of unease while being watched, one clerk described the inspector as being ‘quiet, 
almost stealthy. His small grey, red-rimmed eyes regarded me furtively’.38 McKinlay and 
Wilson go so far as to suggest that the inspection could be a dehumanising process, 
concentrating on process rather than people.39  
 Perhaps reflective of their modes of working, for the most part, the information 
collected by the Inspectors was recorded in four main formats: the list, the narrative, usually 
presented as evidence given by one or more of the clerks, the cross-examination and the 
summation of findings and recommendations. There is very little use of complex numerical 
calculation in the Inspectors’ report, although that clearly was a central part of the Bank’s 
business. These formats are consistent with late-nineteenth-century inspections which 
McKinlay and Wilson describe as ‘descriptive, linguistic system[s]’.40 Performance was not 
being made calculable here although, as we shall see, some clerks did certainly measure their 
own performance by use of the clock and reference to specific amounts of work achieved.  
 The use of the list as a means of conveying information was usually confined to the 
introduction to each office or department. Thus, when the Committee examined Abraham 
Newland, the chief cashier, ‘he laid before them a List of the Several Officers in his 
department’. The list read:  
     No. 1.   The InTellers who receive & pay Money.  
2. The OutTellers who receive Money for bills of exchange & notes of hand 
at the houses of the persons to whom they are address’d.  
3. The Clerks in the Drawing Office where the Accounts are kept of those 
persons who keep cash at the Bank.  
4. The Clerks in the Bill Office where the Accounts are kept of the bills & 
notes left by those persons who keep cash at the Bank to be receiv’d when 
due & placed to their accounts. And the Clearers who receive of the 
OutTellers the money collected daily by them for payment of bills.  
5. The Clerks at the Cash Books where the Bank Notes & Bank Post Bills are 
made out & entered when issued & when paid.  
6. The Clerks in the Discount Office  
                                                          
38 McKinlay and Wilson, ‘“Small acts of cunning”, p. 666.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid., p. 658.  
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7. The Clerks in the Bullion Office.  
8. The Clerks who receive the public money on accot of Loans.  
9. The Clerks who attend the Receipt of his Majesty’s Exchequer on the 
Bank’s Accot.  
10. The Care of the Treasure not in the Vaults under the inspection of the 
Cashiers.  
11. The Clerks who pay the Interest to the Proprietors of Bank Stock & of 
such part of the national Debt as is transacted there.  
12. The Clerks who check the same or the Warrant Office.  
13. The Clerks who receive & pay money on accot of the Suitors in the Court 
of Chancery, & 
14. The Clerks at the General Cash Book.41  
 
The use of the list suggests ordered information which would seem to indicate that the senior 
clerks had been working on their testimonies prior to their meetings with the Inspectors, 
gathering information and ensuring that they fully understood the complexities of their offices 
and the working day.   
The list was then followed by a narrative of the daily activities of each office. The 
narrative was bounded by clock time relating to both working time and daily operations. Thus, 
Mr Lander, one of the cashiers in the banking hall, number one in Abraham Newland’s list, 
informed the Inspectors:  
That the attendance of the 8 Cashiers in the Hall begins every morning at 9 o’clock: 
at 12 or ½ past 12, 4 of them are allowed to go to Dinner & must return by 2, when 
the other 4 go off entirely; that 2 of the first 4 wait at night, one to see the blank 
Notes counted & locked up, the other to attend the general Balance…42 
 
Equally, Mr Bourne of the Bill Office, number four on the list, noted that the ‘Chest of 
discounted Bills is unlock’d every morning at 9 o’clock & not shut up again ‘till 5’.43 Mr Campe 
reported of the Warrant Office, number twelve on the list, that ‘the time of attendance… is 
from 9 to 3, the hours of payment, & as much longer as is necessary to settle their Accounts’.44 
Thus the clerks presented a broadly descriptive account of the functions already observed by 
the Inspectors but one that was undoubtedly reflective of the ideal day when all clerks were 
present, nobody was late and nothing out of the ordinary occurred.  
The reference to clock time can be argued to have performed three important functions 
within the narratives offered by the clerks. First, it established that each office and position was 
associated with a useful post and was occupied by men performing a role rather than placemen 
                                                          
41 BEA, M5/212, fos. 3-4.  
42 Ibid. fo. 117. 
43 Ibid., fo. 43.  
44 Ibid., fo. 36.  
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taking a fee. Second, it could be argued that the reference to clock time raised the quality and 
credibility of evidence. It was, for example, a technique of long-standing in evidence-giving in 
courts. There use of clock time in the narration of events was a common way of establishing 
the veracity of evidence.45 Interestingly, many of the testimonies also began with the clerks 
stating their length of service at the Bank. This was arguably another way in which the clerks 
could support their evidence. Long experience implied knowledge and understanding of a 
variety of the Bank’s systems, as well as the support of the institution itself. The third obvious 
use of the clock in narratives was its employment as a means of the clerks demonstrating their 
own commitment and hard work. Thus, Mr Lander, one of the cashiers, on being asked how 
many Notes he could sign in a specified time answered ‘about 100 Notes in 20 Minutes if not 
interrupted’.46 Mr Bentley, of the Bills Office, described a working day that extended into the 
evening requiring him to work past 5 for never ‘less time than two hours & a half or three 
hours, but very frequently 4 or 5. That he is very seldom out of the Office before 8 at night, if 
the business is heavy much later, & on a Saturday generally ‘till 10 or 11 o’clock’.47 
The overviews that were presented to the Inspectors by the senior men suggest that those 
men exercised a close control over their offices and the detail and precision offered, especially 
in the use of clock time, argues for an ordered system of management at the Bank. But an 
obvious question arises about how far the narratives represented the realities of working at the 
Bank. We can speculate that compliance with the standing rules of the Bank was undoubtedly 
higher when the Inspectors visited a particular office.48 Moreover, the long establishment of 
the Committee undoubtedly taught both supervisors and junior clerks what to expect with 
regard to the Inspectors’ visits and interviews. Practices were certainly adapted in advance of 
the Inspectors’ visits. Thus, with regard to the checking of the bank notes kept in store it was 
noted that it ‘used only to be customary to have this operation performed about once a Week, 
but within this fortnight Mr Newland has directed it should be performed daily’.49 Equally, Mr 
Campe, one of the in-tellers, referring to the practice of counter-signing day books noted that 
it had been discontinued but ‘he thinks it right it should be adopted again & has actually begun 
                                                          
45 P. Glennie and N. Thrift, Shaping the Day: a history of time-keeping in England and Wales, 1300-1800 
(Oxford, 2011), p. 215. Hans-Joachim Voth also noted the prominence of clock time in court depositions. H-J. 
Voth, Time and Work in England, 1750-1830 (Oxford, 2000).  
46 BEA, M5/212, fo. 117.  
47 BEA, M5/213, fos. 6-7. 
48 Bartrip suggests a similar effect after the establishment of a full-time professional agency for factory 
inspection. P. W. J. Bartrip, ‘British Government Inspection, 1832–1875: Some Observations’, The Historical 
Journal, 25 (1982), p. 613.  
49 BEA, M5/212, fo. 115.  
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to use it since he heard the Committee had suggested the Idea in the Pay Office’.50 This learning 
from the Inspectors’ previous work and reports indicates the importance of the Inspection and 
how closely it was being watched by some, if not all, of the clerks in the Bank. It also points 
to a desire to anticipate the Inspectors’ findings which, perhaps, offers some evidence that the 
clerks were finding the Inspection rather daunting.  
Drawing on other records preserved at the Bank presents contradictions to the Inspectors’ 
findings. For example, the Minutes of the Committee for House and Servants recorded in July 
1783 that ‘Edmund Smith, Peter Bagwell, Richard Payne, John Little, William Rosse, Thomas 
Curtis, John Cartlich and Samuel Gore’ had all been absent more than two months in this 
quarter.51 This is perhaps not unexpected in a period where long-term sickness or disability was 
not easily managed. Nonetheless, it points to a significant level of absence over a long period 
of time and none of this was noted in the Inspectors’ findings. Clearly, therefore, some things 
were overlooked, perhaps as being the concern of other internal agencies, and other things were 
not revealed to the Inspectors.  
It is also clear that most senior men went into their interviews determined to present their 
offices and their subordinates in the best possible light. Hence Mr Clifford of the Drawing 
Office informed the Inspectors that ‘the Gentlemen under his charge were very regular & well 
qualified for their business, which was very necessary, for matters of immense consequence 
passed through their hands’.52 Likewise Mr Turner of the 3 per cent Reduced Consols Office 
informed the Inspectors that the men working for him ‘were all in a proper degree of 
subordination & in general well qualified for their places, though he cannot pretend to say they 
are all equally expert & Masters of their business’.53 Only one senior man broke this consensus. 
Abraham Vickery, head of the 3 per cent Consols Office informed the Inspectors that ‘as soon 
as he heard this Committee was appointed, he informed all the clerks under him that, when 
called before the Committee, he would openly & candidly declare all he knew concerning their 
conduct’.54 He went on to accuse the men under him of numerous transgressions against the 
Bank’s rules. Yet, in a private notebook kept by Samuel Bosanquet, one of the Inspectors, it 
was revealed that a number of clerks had poor relations with Vickery, that ‘bad words’ had 
been exchanged in a number of instances and that there was ‘cause for discontent in the Consols 
                                                          
50 Ibid., fo. 41.  
51 BEA, M5/376, Minutes of the Committee for House and Servants, fo. 157.  
52 BEA, M5/212, fo. 85.  
53 BEA, M5/213, fos. 44-45.  
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Office against Mr Vickery’.55 It is perhaps notable that only Vickery’s complaints were 
recorded in the formal minutes but certainly interesting that the Inspectors delved deeper than 
the surface in finding out the rights and wrongs of the situation.  
Indeed, the Inspectors were clearly not easily distracted from their purpose and did their 
utmost to discover the realities of working practices. Thus, in relation to the management of 
the Bill Office, Mr Church, the chief man, initially gave evidence about the full extent of the 
working day. He was later reported by one of his subordinates to ‘quit the Office about 3 
o’clock’ each day’. Following this revelation the Inspectors perceptively observed that Church 
‘cannot be so well acquainted with the business transacted after his departure as the other 
Clerks’.56 They, thereafter, interviewed other clerks in the same office to get a better sense of 
the realities of the work. Church was one of the very first men to be interviewed in March 1783 
and it is notable that the practice of interviewing more than one clerk in each office continued 
thereafter with note often being taken when they corroborated or contradicted each other’s 
accounts.57  
The most sustained period of cross-examination in the Inspectors’ reports related to 
transgressions of the Bank’s standing rules in the Stock Transfer Offices. The rules prevented 
clerks from acting as brokers or jobbing the market themselves but the Inspectors soon found 
that this rule was being generally ignored. Thus, Mr Aldridge, when interviewed, confessed 
that he had now and again acted as a broker but had never jobbed.  Mr Windsor said he had 
acted as a broker and although he had not jobbed recently, ‘he has now & then sold & bought 
a little stock which he has held for his friends’. Mr Crockford allowed that ‘he had made 
Bargains in Stock for time, both on his own account & on that of his Principals’.58 Mr Brown 
also admitted to acting as a broker occasionally ‘but in a very trifling way’. They all also 
attempted to claim that they did not know of any order against acting as a broker.59 This seems 
disingenuous at best. Samuel Beachcroft’s governor’s diary, which covered the period from 
1775 to 1777, contained a number of references to anonymous informers against clerks acting 
as jobbers and brokers, suggesting that this kind of activity was brought to the Bank’s attention 
on a regular basis. Moreover, Beachcroft’s disapproval was passed on to the clerks. He 
recorded in his diary that ‘Upon an anonymous letter from the stock brokers & jobbers, Mr 
                                                          
55 BEA, Memorandum book of Samuel Bosanquet, 1783-1791, M5/471, unpaginated. 
56 BEA, M5/212, fo. 18.  
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58 BEA M5/213, fos. 67; 84; 85.  
59 Ibid, fo. 96.  
13 
 
Pearce & Mr Pemberton were call’d in & reprimanded for dealing in Stocks’.60 Yet, 
Beachcroft’s admonishments seem to have made little impact. Both Pearce and Pemberton 
were still employed by the Bank in 1783 when the Committee of Inspection convened and both 
confessed to still being involved in the financial markets.61 The Inspectors, nonetheless, 
reiterated their concerns in this respect and worried that the clerks who engaged with their 
practices were having their minds seduced ‘from regular employment in an easy service, & 
attaching them to objects inviting though dangerous…’.62   
 Although predominantly a narrative exercise, it appears clear that the Bank’s Inspection 
was a rigorous process which did function as a way to identify specific concerns. Moreover, 
the Bank’s Inspectors, like the Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts, were not 
just on a fact-finding mission. They assessed their findings, measured them against certain 
standards and made recommendations in areas that were of the most obvious concern to them. 
It may be argued that in doing so they were at least shoring up, and at most imposing, a 
‘bureaucratic system of organisation’. As Torrance argued with regard to the Commission, it 
was a system in which ‘speed, precision, impartiality, uniformity and accountability’ had 
become objects of good in themselves and not just worth pursuing for the sake of frugality.63 
In order to understand how this systems of organisation were imposed, the final section of this 
article will consider how the Inspectors measured the Bank’s processes and their 
recommendations for change.   
   
III 
 
 
The Bank had been in existence since 1694 and its operations commenced with a staff of just 
17.64 It had grown relatively slowly in its early years but by the 1780s the number of clerks had 
risen to over three hundred, the nature and amount of work had expanded considerably and it 
is clear that the War of American Independence had put a significant strain on the Bank’s long-
standing systems.65 Indeed, while quantification was not a dominant theme in the Inspectors’ 
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reports, the clerks did find it of use when describing recent increases in business. Thus, the 
Inspectors’ reports record that the issue of 4% annuities during the War of American 
Independence resulted in such an increase of business that the clerks had to open 19,500 new 
accounts in one day.66 More than 65,000 dividend warrants were issued for payment on 5 
January 1783 and nearly 59,000 in April 1783.67 The clerks who kept the K cash book, in which 
were recorded notes in long lists for the Exchequer, other public offices and to some bankers, 
estimated that they made up around 20,000 notes a month.68 Mr Isaac Pilleau estimated that 
137,000 bills of exchange had been discounted in the course of 1782. Each discount required a 
posting to the account with and the account upon at the time of discount and from the two 
accounts at the time of payment.69 The work of compiling a list of unpaid dividends for the 
Exchequer was so time-consuming that it could take up to 5 or 6 months.70 
It is no surprise that when confronted with such issues the Inspectors spent much time 
exploring the most efficient means of doing the work. One of the measures against which they 
judged the clerks, therefore, was speed of working and some of their first actions were designed 
to increase efficiency. Thus, a plan to revise systems of issuing banknotes was offered with the 
endorsement that ‘the Publick will be accommodated on demand without the delay they are 
now subject to…’71 It was also noted that the plan might involve sending the cancelled notes 
to the pay clerks ‘from time to time, as they come in…& by this means occasion less delay in 
making up the Pay Clerk’s account in the evening’.72 Similarly, recommendations for changes 
in systems used in the Bill Office were made because the Inspectors observed that ‘this 
operation takes up a considerable space of time, & frequently occasions the business of the 
Office to continue, ’till very late at night before it is finished’.73 
Speed and timing of work was most problematic in the Transfer Offices, partly because 
of the pressure of dealing with such a large amount of business but partly because this was one 
of the most obviously public-facing areas of the Bank. The Inspectors’ reports thus noted ‘very 
frequent complaints, in regard to delays and inconveniences experienc’d by the Publick in 
receiving their Dividends’.74 Mr Selby, one of the supervisors in the 3 per cent Consols Office, 
explained that this was because ‘the number of tickets for transfers put in in the last quarter of 
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an hour before 1 o’clock is more than the whole number given in during the rest of the day: 
these take so much time to be entered, that it is usually 2 o’clock or very near it before they are 
completed.’75 This created knock-on delays in the payment of dividends which was what 
occasioned so many customer complaints. The Inspectors’ remedies for this were to employ 
more staff, reorganise the offices and restrict the times during which transfers of stock could 
be effected. Clearly the Inspectors took seriously the questions of service to the investing public 
that were raised by problems in the transfer and dividend payment systems. This implies a 
deeper significance to their actions. Scholars have suggested that the successes of the English 
financial revolution depended on a ‘credible commitment’ on the part of Parliament to honour 
its financial promises.76 The Bank has been identified as the embodiment of these promises.77 
Arguably the fact that the Inspectors sought to impose strict routines and more or less precise 
time-keeping on the management of the national debt reinforced the message that here was an 
institution which guaranteed the security of invested funds.  
A further means used by the Inspectors to judge the effectiveness of work at the Bank 
was to measure it against standing orders already in place to see if they were being complied 
with. We have already seen the most prominent example of failure in this regard in the 
Inspectors’ investigations of the Transfer Offices. In other places though the Inspectors noted 
with satisfaction that sound systems were in place. Thus, with regard to the actual business of 
transferring stock they were clear that ‘so many checks being established as to render it scarcely 
possible that an error should be overlooked’.78 The maintenance of the accounts of the suitors 
in the Court of Chancery was also deemed robust. The clerks reported,  
a general balance being taken every year in the month of October, when the Account 
is pricked over, & agreed with the Chancery Account: after which it is signed by 
the Head of this Office, & then certified by the Chief Accountant of the Bank, when 
it is sent to the Accountant General of the Court of Chancery, who delivers it to the 
Lord Chancellor.79  
 
Security, on the other hand, was found to be less satisfactory in numerous instances and 
with regard both to paper and physical systems. It became clear in the report that despite there 
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being systems in place to secure money, notes, papers and ledgers, they were not always used 
and lessons were not being learned. Thus, a significant fraud committed by Charles 
Clutterbuck, a clerk in the Cashier’s Office, had resulted in no changes to the system that had 
facilitated his offence. Clutterbuck had taken advantage of inadequacies in the Bank’s 
procedures to forge banknotes to the amount of £5,930.80  Yet, the Inspectors found that 
‘opportunities still occur every day similar to that which enabled Clutterbuck to perpetrate the 
fraud he lately committed: for in fact there is no effectual check on the Clerks…’81 The 
Inspectors, therefore, spent much of their time engaged in finding new and ‘safe’ systems for 
the production and storage of notes and bills. Indeed, they explained in their first report that 
‘To form a plan that may put so very large a property in a State of Security; without at the same 
time impeding the established course of business; has engaged much of our attention’.82 
It was not just the risk of fraud that occupied the Inspectors. Physical security at the 
Bank was found to be lax. Thus, bills of exchange, which were locked away at night in the iron 
closet in the Court Room, were taken out and left in open drawers all day during the hours of 
business.83 Clerks were seen to leave their ‘notebooks’ (most probably day books) open on 
their desks if they were called away rather than secured in a drawer or locker.84 Various account 
books and ledgers were left out on desks overnight, rather than being locked away.85 Owing to 
lax management of keys, sensitive areas of the Bank could also be accessed by relatively junior 
staff or by staff operating in a solitary capacity.86 It was also noted that the previous 4 or 5 
years unpaid dividend warrants were kept in a wooden cupboard to which all clerks in that 
office had a key.87 Storage units themselves were often judged unfit for purpose. Wooden 
drawers and cupboards were condemned as being too easy to break into. The Inspectors also 
noted the use of small iron chests that were in some cases ‘very light, weak, not fix’d to the 
floor, & in all respects insufficient for the security of so large a property as is frequently there 
deposited’.88 Another concern was the number of keys issued. Indeed, unlike the household to 
which there were often just one set of keys, a measure which restricted access to and monitored 
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movements within the house,89 some keys at the Bank had proliferated and many were in the 
hands of junior and unsupervised clerks. The greatest risk to the Bank’s business, therefore, 
was not thieves or fraudsters but lax management. Thus the Inspectors devoted the entirety of 
their second report to improving the security of the Bank’s notes and bills.  
It is notable that, on the surface at least, the Inspectors spent less time examining the 
men and their shortcomings. Personalities were not assessed in the Inspectors’ formal minutes, 
nor was individual fitness for work but we do know they were considered. Samuel Bosanquet 
kept a separate notebook in which we find recorded his own views and the privately expressed 
views of the heads of some offices regarding the Bank’s servants. Some men he thought to be 
merely adequate. Mr Bloomer was judged to be ‘not bright but [he] does as bid’. And there is 
a strong indication that the older men at the Bank were thought to be less than effective. Of Mr 
Gardner, Bosanquet wrote, ‘a poor hand, obstinate and prejudiced to the old mode…’, as well 
Mr Gardner may have been after serving 39 years in the Bank! Bosanquet was more overtly 
critical of other staff. Mr Bridges, principal of the dividend warrants was condemned as ‘a 
chattering fellow, not fit to be placed in any more conspicuous light’. Mr Kingdon was reported 
as having been rather rude to the public and not well qualified for his role due to ‘natural 
defects’. Mr Wilde was noted as having ability but apparently he ‘drinks & then [gets] muddled 
& lost’. Bosanquet was less fulsome in his praise of staff but did note some rising stars. Mr 
Walsh was judged to be ‘very intelligent, very able, and the only one fit for a head yet seen’. 
Mr Walton of the 3 per Cent Reduced Office was pronounced to be a ‘very clever hand, very 
sensible and capable’. And Mr Martin was sober and very capable.90 There is, however, no 
evidence that Bosanquet acted on his findings to either promote where he found merit or punish 
where he found failings.  
Indeed, in their official reports the Inspectors confined themselves to very general 
comments about the men, noting their general good behaviour while still recommending ‘in 
the strongest terms to the Inferiors, a due subordination to the Superiors; & a ready compliance 
with their orders’ and reminding the Court of Directors to ‘pay great attention to the abilities 
& characters of those they nominate; & at the time of Election, to their performances’.91 Their 
only specific criticism was directed at the senior men who often left their desks by 3.30 in the 
afternoon. Thus, the Inaspectors admonished the senior men for:  
leaving the charge of every thing to the vigilance & honesty of the Junior Clerks, 
(frequently such as are very young in Office), & not considering it as any part of 
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their duty to attend to the  subsequent transactions of the day. This practice, beyond 
a doubt, must have crept in by degrees, for we deem it impossible that it ever could 
have received the deliberate approbation of a Court of Directors; & however Time 
may have sanctified the custom, the reverse of it would have appeared a much more 
natural regulation: for surely if in any situation of Trust a compleat superintendence 
is desireable, it must be more immediately necessary where the Trust is of such 
infinite importance.92 
 
Given the reforming agenda of the early 1780s and widespread fears about corruption 
in public office, it is finally worthy of note that the Inspectors, while they certainly questioned 
many staff about possible corrupt practices and especially with regard to the receiving of 
gratuities, they did little about this. Indeed, the Inspectors stated their desire to promote both 
the honour and prosperity of the Bank by putting a halt to the taking of gratuities which they 
argued was both contrary to one of the Bank’s bye laws and also ‘liable to occasion 
dissatisfaction & heart-burnings amongst the Clerks’ as a consequence of unequal distribution 
of tips and also likely ‘to give rise to partialities & unjust preferences, towards the Publick’. 
Yet they also argued that the practice was so firmly established that it could not be eliminated 
but must rather be regulated:  
by excluding the Chiefs from any participation, & ordering equal distributions 
amongst the inferior Clerks, by which means the Chiefs would become a check on 
the inferiors & prevent unreasonable exactions on the Publick: but in this case, it 
will be equitable to allow an increase of salary to the former by way of 
compensation.93 
 
We may argue, therefore, that the Bank’s Inspection was ‘fiscal conservatism’, but it was fiscal 
conservatism tempered by realism. 
 
IV 
 
The Bank’s 1783 Inspection suffered from no lack of resources or powers of enforcement but 
its impact was nonetheless relatively limited. In part this was because the Inspectors’ approved 
of a great deal of what they saw. In part this was because the Inspectors had a very strong sense 
of the Bank’s contribution to the wider economy. The closing words of their report were:  
When we contemplate the immense importance of the Bank of England not only to 
the City of London, in points highly essential to the promotion & extension of its 
Commerce, but to the Nation at large, as the grand Palladium of Public Credit, we 
cannot but be thoroughly persuaded that an Object so great in itself & so interesting 
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to all Ranks of the Community, must necessarily excite care & solicitude in every 
breast, for the wise administration of its Affairs, but principally and directly in theirs 
who are entrusted with the immediate management of them: We deem it therefore 
superfluous to say a single word to the Court with a view of inculcating a religious 
Veneration for the glorious fabrick, or of recommending a steady and unremitting 
attention to its sacred Preservation.94    
 
The system of inspection at the Bank, however, once implemented was not halted. Permanent 
committees were established for monitoring the most important of the Bank’s functions. From 
the start of the nineteenth century, a closer eye was kept on the recruitment and management 
of staff and the management of the Bank’s functions. The result of this was tighter internal 
controls and the maintenance of the efficiency for which the Bank was already justly feted.  
 These systems of inspection and measurement of performance offer us two important 
insights into public finance at the end of the eighteenth century. First, they should be seen as 
part of the development of a much broader system of inspection that encompassed much of 
developed economy by the mid-nineteenth century. Managerial capitalism, in all its aspects, 
was working well at the late eighteenth century Bank of England and it is important to 
acknowledge its early development. Equally, it is useful to acknowledge the contribution of 
managerial transparency and effectiveness to the development of trust in the British public 
finances. This point has been acknowledged in the work of scholars like Brewer and Daunton, 
who have focused on the ways in which efficient systems of taxation underpinned the workings 
of the national debt.95 It is time that scholars turned their attention in this respect to the British 
state’s systems of borrowing. Taxation was essential certainly but borrowing provided the 
immediate funds needed in emergent situations like war. Taxation could be enforced, lending 
was voluntary. To understand the success of the British state, it is necessary to understand much 
more fully how it borrowed. Giving attention to the processes by which it managed that 
borrowing is an important, and hitherto neglected, part of the story.  
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